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Abstract The latest iteration of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
uncertainty guidance is simpler and easier to use than the previous version. However, its
primary focus remains assessing “what is at risk” under climate change, thus is most
suitable for dealing with the scientific uncertainties in Working Group I and part of
Working Group II findings. I distinguish between tame and complex risks, arguing that the
guidance is most suited to assessing tame risks. Climate change is a complex risk, and as
such as can be divided into idealized, calculated and perceived risks. While science has
claims to objectivity, risk has a specific value component: when measuring gain and loss,
calculated risks compete with risky options to manage those risks. The IPCC is charged
with calculating risk (IPCC 2007, p22) but the communication of key findings takes place
in an environment of competing perceived risks. Recommendations for managing this
complex environment include separating scientific and risk-based findings, treating
uncertainties for each separately; strengthening the philosophical basis of uncertainty
management; application of a methodical scientific research program; clearly communicat-
ing competing findings, especially in the social sciences; and application of multiple frame
to policy-relevant findings as reflected in the literature.
1 Introduction
Human-induced climate change is a wicked problem beset by multiple risks. These risks are
diverse and not necessarily commensurate in how they are framed by experts, decision-
makers or the ordinary person (Giddens 2009; Hulme 2009). The risks of a changing
climate can be framed in different ways. For example, measures of impact risks include
assessing key vulnerabilities to help define anthropogenic interference with the climate
system (Schneider et al. 2007); the market costs of economic impacts at market cost or
change in future welfare measured as the social cost of carbon (Tol 2009; Watkiss 2011).
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Uncertainties associated with mitigating climate risks are similarly diverse. Various
methods manage tangible and intangible values differently, and apply different rates of
time preference and cultural values. Governance structures for implementing climate policy
are also influenced by a range of views. These diverse frames introduce other types of
uncertainty that extend well beyond scientific uncertainty.
The IPCC’s charter is to deliver policy-relevant advice. This advice is not restricted to
scientific findings about future climate but also includes the impact of decisions made as a
result of those findings. Such advice will be interdisciplinary rather than disciplinary in
nature; therefore narrowly-focused uncertainty guidance is unlikely to be sufficient for
decision-making needs.
A narrow focus will apply consensus to scientific findings but might also seek to frame
policy-relevant advice in consensus terms. It may “play safe” relying on conventional
interpretations of disciplinary approaches to managing uncertainty. A broad focus will
describe the consensus scientific view, but will also communicate all scientific evidence, no
matter how uncertain, that contributes to the plausible range of potential future climate
risks. For policy, uncertainty arises where the same evidence is interpreted in different
ways. Because of the difficulty in assessing a “best” policy in any objective sense, a range
of policy positions may be valid. While a central goal of uncertainty guidance has been to
overcome misinterpretation of the science, a consensus approach to framing policy-relevant
advice is not appropriate for guidance contributing to diverse decision-making strategies.
This paper explores how the above issues relate to the recent uncertainty guidance
prepared for the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5; Mastrandrea et al., 2010). It
contrasts the issue of “wicked risks” in complex systems with tame risks faced in simpler
situations. The current guidance does not distinguish between the communication of
science and of risk, despite risk having a specific value component that measures benefit or
harm. While this may be appropriate for tame risks, wicked risks are characterized by
conflicts between scientifically calculated risks, different but valid ways to calculate those
risks and perceived risks. For complex risks, there is a strong case for separating the risk
analytic stage from the risk management stage, because of the uncertainty surrounding the
decisions taken to manage those risks; i.e., both climate change and its management are
risky.
1.1 History
The initial motivation for providing IPCC guidance on uncertainty was to develop common
language to ensure the consistent communication of findings and improve the understand-
ing of climate risk (Moss and Schneider, 2000). The use of unquantified terms in
communication such as “likely”, “unlikely” and “probable” conveys overlapping and
widely varying ranges of likelihoods. Furthermore, these ranges are perceived as being even
wider by recipients of that communication (Morgan et al. 1990; Moss and Schneider 2000).
Two further iterations of IPCC guidance have since been produced (IPCC 2005;
Mastrandrea et al. 2010). Comprehensive guidance for uncertainty management has also
been prepared by the US Climate Change Science Program (Climate Change Science
Program 2009; National Assessment Synthesis Team 2001). The scientific component of
this guidance is broadly consistent with the IPCC (they share common authors and origins)
but the latter especially expands into cognitive challenges and decision-making. Other
recent efforts have dealt with complex system issues, for example combining qualitative
and quantitative uncertainty and incorporating reflexive learning (Van Der Sluijs et al.
2005; 2008).
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The principal focus of the IPCC uncertainty guidance is on confidence and likelihood.
The latest version provides qualitative guidance for confidence and quantitative guidance
for likelihood. Uncertainty was not described consistently across the Working Groups
during the Third Assessment Report (TAR), so that became a major aim of the AR4
guidance (Manning et al. 2004). The AR4 guidance provided quantitative scales for
confidence expressed as odds and likelihood expressed as probabilities but qualitative
descriptions for confidence were preferred by author teams. The two quantitative
scales were criticized in the InterAcademy Review of the IPCC for being confusing
and of limited use (Committee to Review the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change Science Program, 2010). The review recommended that the derivation of
confidence and likelihood should be traceable, terms conveying likelihood be linked to
quantitative ranges, confidence be qualitative, findings be well defined and that the
precision of likelihood be influenced by level of confidence as outlined by Risbey and
Kandlikar (2007).
Decision-making is framed as the response to scientific findings about risks under
climate change, and the guidance material is most suited to communicating the analytic
stages of risk assessment. This covers the results of Working Group I on climate science
and Working Group II on impacts. However, the guidance is less suited to communicating
the latter stages of risk management; namely, adaptation and mitigation. Some of the issues
raised in the introduction: multiple frames, incommensurate values and how “good” policy
can be distinguished from “poor” policy have received little attention. While the IPCC can
assess the means to test policy benefits it cannot explicitly prescribe policy options—nor
should it implicitly do so by framing adaptation and mitigation in specific ways. Lacking is
guidance on how to assess and communicate competing frameworks for the risk assessment
and management of climate change.
1.2 Scope of IPCC findings
The potential scope of findings can be explored via the IPCC’s terms of reference and
through specific requests from the members of the IPCC for AR5. The role of the IPCC is
to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical
and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of
human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and
mitigation. IPCC reports should be neutral with respect to policy, although they may need
to deal objectively with scientific, technical and socio-economic factors relevant to the
application of particular policies (IPCC 1998). With regard to policy, the following agreed
paragraph from the recent United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Council of Parties meeting informs the assessment of adaptation policy: Affirms
that enhanced action on adaptation should be undertaken in accordance with the
Convention; follow a …, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into
consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems; and be based on and
guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional and indigenous
knowledge; with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant social, economic and
environmental policies and actions (Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Co-operative
Action 2010). Although this guidance originates from member countries (governments), the
reference to actions which can be both public and private, are relevant to a wide audience.
Here, the audience of IPCC reports is considered to be decision-makers at any level.
Since its formation the IPCC, UNFCCC and their member nations have been carrying
out an iterative risk assessment and management exercise (IPCC 2007). The emphasis has
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progressively moved from scoping and analysis through to risk evaluation, management
and monitoring (Jones 2004). To date key findings have been dominated by the natural
sciences and only more recently have included options for adaptation and mitigation. The
key findings in earlier reports delineated the scope for uncertainty guidance provided for
both the AR4 and AR5 reports. The focus has therefore concentrated on scientific findings
describing the behavior of climate and of systems responding to climate change, projections
of change and the risks of climate change.
2 Addressing uncertainties in science and risk
Risk in the IPCC guidance is framed as probability and consequence (IPCC 2007;
Mastrandrea et al., 2010; Schneider, 2001; Schneider et al. 2007). Risk is most often
addressed as a linear process where a risk is identified, analyzed, evaluated and managed,
however interacting risks can become very complex. Probability and consequence can
apply to event and outcome-based approaches (Sarewitz et al. 2003), where risk can either
be characterized as the result of a series of events or as the likelihood of exceeding or
attaining a given outcome (Jones and Preston 2011). The international standard on risk
defines risk as the effect of uncertainty on objectives (ISO 2009). This broader definition
factors in not only the likelihood of a risk occurring, but also whether a set of objectives
may be achieved or not when options for risk management themselves are uncertain.
The US Climate Change Science Program, in preparing an extensive survey of
methods suitable for a range of different aspects of uncertainty management, warns that
simple recipe-based approaches are insufficient (Climate Change Science Program
2009). This highlights the tension between developing the appropriate context to support
decision-making in complex situations and communicating uncertainty clearly and
simply. A longer-term research program may be needed to develop appropriate material
to service the entire scope of IPCC findings.
The uncertainty guidance needs to support scientific findings in an environment where
uncertainty is being exploited to undermine climate science and policy (Kitcher 2010;
Oreskes and Conway 2010). Two of the key measures recommended here are to strengthen
the philosophical basis for uncertainty management as flagged by Kitcher (2010) and to
better articulate the relationship between science and risk and between tame and complex
risks. The next section addresses the first point and the following section the latter.
2.1 Epistemic and ontological treatment of scientific uncertainty
The confidence-likelihood metrics of the uncertainty guidance form an epistemological-
ontological structure: confidence is epistemological and likelihood is ontological. The
twinned basis for a key scientific finding combines ontological reasons—what the author
team knows—and epistemological reasons—how confident are they in that knowledge—
for a particular conclusion or set of conclusions, describing as Dancy (1995) puts it our
rights to the beliefs we have. To date, key findings have mainly been communicated
ontologically: “This is what the science says”, as interpreted by an expert panel. The
epistemic basis of those findings has largely relied on the authority of the IPCC and the
comprehensiveness of the assessments, making the findings vulnerable to attack if that
authority can be undermined.
Scientific findings on climate change are being interpreted by the broader public through
the lens of risk. The science of climate change itself is viewed as harmful by a specific set
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of interest groups and world views (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Scientific consensus is
often confused with group consensus; the public are largely unaware of the role of theory in
establishing scientific knowledge, especially confusing straightforward refutation with
falsification. The common message conveyed in the media and online is that if one can
establish a statistical trend different to a forecast trend, the underpinning theory is falsified.
Most of those statistical analyses are easily shown to be invalid (Enting 2007).
Making purely epistemological statements about the knowledge contributing to a finding
will assist in the communication of controversial science. This is a different role than using
scientific confidence to inform the precision of likelihoods. For example, the existence of a
risk can attract high confidence but have low predictability; e.g., future sea level rise from
melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet.
The unstructured approach the IPCC has taken to epistemological issues is highlighted by
Chapter 6 of (IPCC 2007) Robust findings and key uncertainties, which reads like a shopping
list. Structure could have been provided by identifying both positive and negative heuristics
grounded in the philosophy of science. This identifies the core theory supporting the
underpinning science and describes where that theoretical base is expanding or contracting by
documenting changes in explanatory power (Lakatos 1970). The core theory for
anthropogenic climate change is the direct radiative forcing response of greenhouse gases
and the positive atmospheric temperature feedback in response to radiative forcing. Most of
the theory that surrounds this is ancillary or supporting theory. An ancillary hypothesis may
attract low confidence, but overturning it does not threaten the basic physics of the
greenhouse effect. This falls into the area of science that Kuhn referred to as the “puzzle
solving” of normal science (Kuhn 1962; 1970). Uncertainties about how warming trends,
changes in sea ice or the global carbon cycle differ from model projections, for example,
cannot be used to disprove the core theoretical basis behind the theory of greenhouse gas-
induced climate change. All they show is that gaps in scientific knowledge still exist.
Although core climate and ancillary theory, and its supporting evidence are described in
the scientific literature and in successive IPCC reports (e.g., EPA 2009; Weart 2008) this
process could be formalized by updating the methodical scientific research program
proposed by Lakatos (1970) with newer material from authors such as Kitcher (2001) and
Roush (2005). Large climate research programs such as those conducted by the World
Climate Research Programme and the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme
closely resemble Lakatos’ framework. Methodical falsification of scientific theory can only
be achieved if core theory is overturned and an alternative theory with better explanatory
power can be proposed (Popper 1972). Core greenhouse theory is supported not only by
theory and process models, further evidence from other planets and the behavior of Earth’s
palaeoclimate suggesting that no viable alternative exists. Often gaps in ancillary theory are
accompanied by very strong empirical evidence. For example, the exact physical processes
influencing evaporation and soil moisture are unclear, however; empirical approximations
provide robust but imprecise predictions.
The agreement/evidence structure of the confidence matrix in the current guidance note
(Table 1, Mastrandrea et al., 2010) is inconsistent with the epistemology of science. In the
matrix, evidence is used as a short-hand for mechanistic understanding, theory, data, models
and expert judgment. However, theory is not evidence, rather evidence is the basis for the
justification or otherwise for a theory. A more accurate label would be knowledge basis,
where evidence becomes a subset of that knowledge, or alternatively theory and evidence.
Agreement is also tailored more to the natural sciences where the prospect of convergence
towards a single theoretical basis is high, whereas divergent theories are common in the social
sciences, often leading from very different philosophical positions. The reasons for these
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differences may be more important for decision-making than establishing a level of
agreement. From this viewpoint, the original table with the quadrants of Speculative,
Established but Incomplete, Competing Explanations and Well Established (Moss and
Schneider 2000) is more useful.
Competing explanations are common in the social sciences. For example, Martin and
Richards (1995) describe four different approaches to controversial scientific issues: positivist,
group politics, the sociology of scientific knowledge—constructivist and social structural.
These approaches can also be used to assess vulnerability and risk. The positivist approach is
characterized by rational decision-making models in decision-analytic settings; for example in
economics by applying revealed market preference for price and discount rates. The group
politics approach brings science to a range of groups in a democratic decision-making
process. This approach is commonly in assessing adaptation options where scenarios are used
to establish a dialogue between scientists, planners and other stakeholders. Sociological
approaches work in two ways: social analysis is applied to scientific knowledge claims as
well as to wider social dynamics and all sides in a controversy are examined using the same
repertoire of conceptual tools (Martin and Richards 1995). Social structural approaches look
at the structure of society, of the state and gender to understand how decision-making
manifests within this framework. For example, the same information exercised by a state
through its power structures may be very different to that exercised at the community level.
In conclusion, a methodological approach to both epistemological and ontological
content that is suitable for both physical and social sciences is recommended. The
interpretation (and often communication) of science as risk feeds directly into the risk
perceptions of the person who receives that information. The reframing of the science
component as a methodical scientific research program with the identification of core and
ancillary theory and document changes in explanatory power will help articulate the
difference between the science itself and science as risk.
2.2 Tame and complex risks
The relationship between science and risk depends on whether risks can be characterized as
being tame or complex, wicked system risks. Tame risks are characterized by a widely
agreed conceptual framing of a given risk. Values are bounded and there is an established
process for calculating risk and for reconciling calculated and perceived risk. Here, the
contribution of scientific information to a risk assessment is relatively straightforward.
Complex risks display a lack of agreement as to how the risks are framed: including the
metrics by which risk is measured and disagreements as to whether a given risk or the set of
Table 1 Type I and Type II error matrix
Hypothesis (H1) is true Null hypothesis (H0) is true
Accept hypothesis H1 Right decision Wrong decision
Type I error
False positive
Accept null hypothesis Wrong decision Right decision
Type II error
False negative
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options proposed to solve that risk will cause the greatest harm (van Der Sluijs et al. 2008).
These risks are consistent with the characteristics associated with a wicked system (Rittel
and Webber 1973): its limits are difficult to constrain, it is multi-causal and has many
interdependencies, addressing the problem will have unforeseen consequences, the issue is
not stable, has no clear conclusion, is socially complex, is not the responsibility of one
organization at single scale, will involve changing behavior and is beset by chronic policy
failure (Australian Public Service Commission 2007) and market failure (Garnaut 2008;
Stern and Treasury, 2007).
The ISO standard for risk (ISO 2009) provides a generic assessment framework for the
risk management process:
1. Establish the context: what do we need to take account of and what are our objectives?
2. Identify the risks: what might happen—how, when and why?
3. Analyze the risks: what will this mean for our objectives?
4. Evaluate the risks: which risks need treating and which are the priority for our
attention?
5. Treat the risks: how best should we deal with them?
Although this process can also be followed for complex risks, it is pursued as a non-linear,
iterative process. Three important aspects of risk with different epistemic origins are idealized
risk, calculated risk and perceived risk. These link the conceptual, technical and believed
aspects of risk. Idealized risk is the cognitive model of risk as it is framed during the scoping
phase of an assessment. The concept of dangerous anthropogenic influence on the climate
system in UNFCCC Article 2 is an example. Calculated risk is the scientific and technical
aspect that aims to estimate an idealized risk and its components as accurately as possible.
This aspect of risk is the primary focus of the guidance document. Science contributes to
calculated risk and to aspects of risk management but risk is explicitly normative due to the
pursuit of value-based objectives.
Perceived risk is the rough estimate of risk by a member of the general public (Althaus
2005) and affects how the findings of a risk assessment are communicated, interpreted and
acted upon. The heuristics of gain and loss, the diverse cultural mapping of attitudes to risk,
different risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviors, rates of time preference and sense of
personal identity all affect perceived risk.
The etymology of risk changes throughout the risk assessment process from a noun to a
verb as does its meaning (Fillmore and Atkins 1992; Hamilton et al. 2007). When a risk is
identified and analyzed, the exposed place, community or process is at risk (noun) because
something of value is vulnerable to harm. Under risk evaluation and management, to risk
(verb) seeks to gain advantage under uncertainty. This change marks a shift from a state of
vulnerability to risk for gain. This transition encounters the uneven heuristics seen in
behavioral economics, where the potential for loss is weighted more strongly than the
possibility of gain (e.g., Kahneman 2003; Tversky and Kahneman 2000).
Biases affecting risk perception also come from the psychological effects of uncertainty
and dread (Weber 2006) that can lead to perceived risk being assessed as up to three orders
of magnitude larger than calculated risk (Smil 2008). Familiar and unfamiliar risks can be
interpreted similarly, in that familiar risks are often more tolerated than more likely but less
familiar risks (Slovic et al., 2004). Culturally-driven perception of risk also leads to the
widely varying perception of risks, including those calculated by experts, by different
stakeholder groups (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Kahan et al. 2007).
For complex risks such as climate change, the different idealised and perceived risks,
combined with significant uncertainties in calculated risk, lead to what has been called the
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risk trap (Beck 2000) or social amplification of risk (Pidgeon et al. 2003) where the risk of
climate change clashes with options to manage those risks. For example, if the mitigation of
climate is perceived as high risk because of the potential cost to the economy and the
difficulty inherent in transforming the global energy-industrial complex, then that risk will
be weighed against the risk of climate change itself.
2.3 Distinguishing between science and risk
The main findings of IPCC assessments have been dominated by an approach that links the
forecasting paradigm used in scientific assessments to the knowledge gap model or
‘rational’ decision-making framework operating on a predict-then-act basis. This is a useful
strategy for tame risks but breaks down in complex policy settings. Furthermore, a rich
literature warns against using inflexible top-down policy frames to manage or communicate
complex policy situations (e.g., Chaffee 1985; Hart and Banbury 1994; Lindblom 1959;
Simon 1976), in favor of a multiple-strategy approach, which is spreading into climate
change scholarship (Dessai et al. 2009; Hulme 2009; Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002;
Verweij et al. 2006; van Der Sluijs et al. 2008). Scientific paradigms that combine theory,
social practice and application (after Masterman 1970) are very different to decision-
making paradigms that combine scientific knowledge with other knowledge. A critical-
deductive decision-making process that works in a scientific research program will fall flat
in a stakeholder-mediated assessment process. The diversity of approaches in managing risk
needs to feature in the communication of key findings and the current guidance does not
clearly reflect this.
Examples of scientific and risk reasoning are illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. The binary Type I
and Type II error matrix that relates to false positive and false negative responses to a
hypothesis or proposition (Table 1) breaks down in the complex risk environment. When the
risk of mitigating risk is itself substantial, political risk becomes a significant influence on risk
perception. Increasing the confidence in the scientific hypotheses contributing to a risk as in
Table 1, or even increasing the knowledge of the risk itself, does not in itself greatly change
the decision for risk mitigation: what type, how much, when and so on (Table 2).
The cost or other risk factors associated with risk mitigation or probability of it being
successful have nothing to do with the success or not of the underlying scientific
hypotheses leading to the assessment of risk. The epistemology of science is different to
that of risk, largely because of the explicit value component involved in risk. Furthermore,
the types of decisions in Table 2 are accompanied by deep uncertainty requiring a very
different treatment to conventional scientific or tame risk problems (Dupuy and Grinbaum
2005; Kandlikar et al. 2005).
Table 2 Risk matrix taking account of when the cost of risk mitigation (RM) is uncertain compared to the
damages avoided in risk
Risk (R) is true No risk (R0) is true
Action—accept RM If Cost(R)>Cost(RM), then
right decision
False positive, ancillary benefits
Delayed action to increase
confidence in p(R|R0)
or p(Cost RM>Cost R)
If new knowledge decreases
Cost(RM) relative to Cost(R),
then right decision
Weak false positive, weak
ancillary benefits
No action—accept R0 False negative Right decision
No action—reject RM Bear consequence Right decision
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3 Conclusion
The latest IPCC uncertainty guidance is most suited to communicating uncertainty in the
natural sciences and natural hazard risks but less suited to communicating social science
findings, complex risks and policy. This has led to a situation where consensus approaches
are being applied to the way policy-relevant advice is being framed, not always
appropriately. As such, the guidance is more suited to tame rather than complex risks.
Human-induced climate change is not a tame risk. To accommodate this complexity, the
following recommendations are made:
& When communicating key findings present science with its claims of objectivity separately
from risk with its value components and treating the uncertainty for each separately.
& Take a more philosophically sound approach to science communication by clearly applying
epistemological and ontological structure to the confidence–likelihood construct.
& Apply a methodical research program overlay to the science to separate core theory
from ancillary theory and make better use of positive and negative heuristics to show
where knowledge is progressing or declining.
& Be clear about competing explanations, especially in the social sciences.
& Be more aware of decision-making paradigms and approaches in framing policy-
relevant advice on risks and risk management options.
The current guidance is a step forward but the issue is whether a leap is required.
Interdisciplinary paradigms are needed to assess and manage uncertainty and its contribution to
decision-making in complex settings. Given the great need for policy-relevant information
suitable for a wide range of contexts, a paradigm shift in uncertainty management is required.
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